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WELLER S. The regional dimensions of the ‘transition to a low-carbon economy’: the case of Australia’s Latrobe Valley, Regional
Studies. Translating concern about climate change into practical, effective and politically feasible policy action is a key challenge for
contemporary governments. In Australia, the government’s failure to launch ‘the transition to a low-carbon economy’ is reshaping
the political landscape. This article argues that progress has stalled because politicians emboldened by the moral challenge of climate
action, but schooled in market-based policy solutions, have not acknowledged or made provision for the regional impacts of the
economic transformation they propose.
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治可行的政策行动是对于当前政府的主要挑战之一。澳大利亚政府部门向低炭经济转型过程中的失败正在重塑其政
治景观。本文认为，这一进程受阻是缘于面对气候议程的道德挑战，政客们将解决方案寄托于以市场为基础的政策
却未意识到、或为经济转型的区域影响作出规定。
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Latrobe en Australie, Regional Studies. Traduire l’inquiétude quant au changement climatique en actions à la fois pratiques, efﬁcaces
et réalisables du point de vue politique, constitue un déﬁ primordial pour les gouvernements d’aujourd’hui. En Australie, l’inca-
pacité du gouvernement à lancer ‘la transition en une économie à faibles émissions de carbone’ remanie le milieu politique. Cet
article afﬁrme que l’on freine le progrès parce que les hommes politiques, enhardis par le déﬁmoral d’agir en faveur du climat, mais
rompus aux solutions déterminées par le marché, n’ont ni fait attention, ni prévu les retombées régionales de la transformation
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WELLER S. Las dimensiones regionales de la ‘transición a una economía hipocarbónica’: el caso del Valle de Latrobe en Australia,
Regional Studies. Traducir la preocupación sobre el cambio climático en medidas políticas que sean prácticas, eﬁcaces y políticamente
viables es un reto fundamental para gobiernos contemporáneos. En Australia, el fracaso del gobierno al tratar de introducir la ‘transición
a una economía hipocarbónica’ está transformando el panorama político. En este artículo argumentamos que el progreso se ha estancado
porque los políticos, alentados por el reto moral de las medidas climáticas, pero educados en soluciones políticas basadas en el mercado,
no han sabido reconocer ni han tenido en cuenta las repercusiones regionales de la transformación económica que proponen.
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INTRODUCTION
Translating concerns about climate change into practical,
effective and politically feasible policy action is a key
challenge for contemporary governments. Some argue
that the technocratic framing of climate imperatives fore-
closes political debate and thrusts policy responses into
the realm of the ‘post-political’ (SWYNGEDOUW, 2010,
p. 214). In Australia, however, the federal government’s
failure to launch ‘the transition to a low-carbon
economy’ is reshaping the political landscape. At the
outset of writing this article, Australia was poised to
implement a carbon trading scheme that would have
brought it into the club of ‘carbon-control’ economies.
During the article’s development, the fragile consensus
favouring a ‘top-down’, national and market-based
carbon-control solution collapsed, claiming in its wake
the careers of both the then Prime Minister and then
Opposition Leader.1 As this ﬁnal draft goes to print,
the political debate has backtracked, carbon control is
(temporarily) off the agenda, and a wider range of
policy options are being entertained. This issue is expos-
ing tensions between the federal government, business
and environmental interests, as well as between the
federal government and Australia’s six state government
policy jurisdictions. As a consequence, national networks
of power are shifting in spatially differentiated ways.
This article examines the Australian government’s
unrealized commitment to shift the economy to a
new low-carbon trajectory. Its central contention is
that Australia’s political paralysis has arisen not because
of a lack of political will, but rather because politicians
emboldened by the moral challenge of climate action
but schooled in market-based policy solutions have
not adequately acknowledged or made provision for
the regional impacts of the economic transformation
they propose.2 The analysis adopts a regulationist per-
spective, examining the politics of carbon-control
policy development as a debate about the nature of
the proposed transition. It contrasts the costs, beneﬁts
and distributional implications of rapid restructuring
with those of a slower evolutionary transformation.
The article contends that the Australian policy impasse
cannot ‘move forward’, in the sloganeering of incoming
Prime Minister Gillard, until decarbonization policies
incorporate convincing strategies to minimize their
adverse regional effects.
The article focuses on the likely impact of Australia’s
now shelved carbon-control policy solution – the
Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) – in
the coal-dependent electricity production centre of the
Latrobe Valley, a locality in the southern Australian state
of Victoria. The Valley’s industries are especially vulnerable
to adverse outcomes as emissions reduction policies are
implemented (GARNAUT, 2008). Single extreme cases
such as this are useful analytically because they highlight
the intricacies of the issues, expose their theoretical disjunc-
tures and disconﬁrm the assumptions on which policies
have been formalized (EMIGH, 1997). This example calls
into question the predictions of large-scale equilibrium-
based quantitative modelling of the likely effects of
carbon-control policies. The research on which the
article is based involved thirty-ﬁve interviews with energy
ﬁrms, contractorﬁrms, unions and local government repre-
sentatives in the Valley as well as interviews with represen-
tatives of relevant Victorian state government departments.
The interviewswere conducted inOctober andNovember
2008, during the consultations that took place after the
release of the federal government’s consultative Green
Paper on the proposed CPRS (COMMONWEALTH OF
AUSTRALIA, 2008a) but before its policy blueprint
White Paper (COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA,
2008b) had been ﬁnalized. The interviews aimed to
provide a ‘bottom-up’ perspective on the local effects of
the CPRS by assessing its likely inﬂuence on research and
development activity, plant renewal, infrastructure, econ-
omic diversiﬁcation and industrial location. The interview
data were used to evaluate the predictions of ‘top-down’
econometricmodelling of theCPRS’s expected outcomes,
costs and beneﬁts. In addition, the research analysed ﬁnely
disaggregated statistical data to assess the importance of coal-
based electricity production activities to the Valley’s
employment structure and labour market.
The article’s theoretical contribution lies in its expansion
of WHILE et al.’s (2010) regulation-oriented ‘eco-state
restructuring’ perspective to assess the social, spatial and
temporal implications of strategic carbon-reduction pro-
jects. By focusing on how the timing of policy change
governs the nature of regional transition, the article fore-
grounds the conﬂicts and power struggles that accompany
the policy change process. The discussion aims to reorient
debates toward thepracticalities of how tomake anequitable
transition to a low-carbon economy. To that end, the
analysis contrasts the spatial relocation expectations of a
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restructuring approach (MASSEY, 1984; STORPER and
WALKER, 1989) with evolutionary economic geography’s
emphasis on in situ path-dependent development
(MARTIN and SUNLEY, 1998).
The article is structured as follows. The next section
introduces regulation-oriented, restructuring and evol-
utionary approaches and explores their relevance to the
challenges of a policy-led transition to a low-carbon
economy. The third section describes Australia’s policy
assessment process and explains its failed attempt to intro-
duce a market-based carbon-control strategy. This pro-
vides the context for the fourth section, which uses the
example of the Latrobe Valley to show that market-
based predictive modelling overestimates regions’
capacity to accommodate rapid change and underesti-
mates the risk of adverse outcomes. The paper concludes
that opposition to pollution reduction measures in Aus-
tralia is grounded in (largely un-articulated) concerns
about the distribution of costs and beneﬁts for regions,
sectors and communities. The ‘way forward’ therefore
lies in incorporating distributional policies to address the
regional consequences of decarbonization.
RESTRUCTURING, LOCK-IN AND
REGIONAL TRANSFORMATION
Geographers have struggled to identify ‘conceptual fra-
meworks that situate environmentalism within the
wider modalities of state regulations’ (WHILE et al.,
2010, p. 77). To theorize the full range of possible
change processes that a transition to a low-carbon
economy might entail, WHILE et al. (2010, p. 80) (also
GIBBS, 2006) proposed examining the process from a
regulation-oriented perspective they called ‘eco-state
restructuring’, which they deﬁned as
the reorganisation of state powers, capacities, regulations
and territorial structures around institutional pathways
and strategic projects, which are… viewed as less environ-
mentally damaging than previous trajectories.
The strength of this approach is its capacity to examine
questions of economic, social and ecological reproduc-
tion at the regional scale, where economic development
processes play out in practice.
Regulation theory provides a means to understand
how states manage their environmental and economic
goals through policy strategies. To rehearse a now
well-known summary, regulation theory views the state
and society as inseparable and mutually reinforcing
elements of a governing regime’s accumulation strategy
(AGLIETTA, 1979). An accompanying hegemonic
‘mode of social regulation’ establishes the formal and
informal rules that enable the system to reproduce itself.
However, system stability is fragile and constantly chal-
lenged by internal contradictions. Periods of relative
stability are therefore punctuated by crises that are
simultaneously economic, social and political in nature.
In an effort to avert impending turbulence and secure
the next round of capitalist growth, states embark on
sets of related policy reforms. These ‘strategic projects’
(JESSOP, 2002) are inherently spatialized and tend to
favour some industries and regions while disadvantaging
others (JONES, 1997). In a world of political contestation,
strategic projects are not always achievable in political or
practical terms. In practice, they are subject to constant
revision, and produce complex mixtures of intended
and unintended outcomes as well as generating unpre-
dictable rates of change. State projects are prone to
failure; the more complex the issues and the more
radical the reform objectives, the higher the likelihood
of failure (JESSOP, 2003). Actual developmental paths
are therefore uncertain, volatile and crucially dependent
on states’ capacities to maintain political support for
their reform programmes. To avert crises that threaten
their legitimacy, states must acknowledge and alleviate
the adverse consequences of their strategies (OFFE, 1975).
Spatialized versions of regulation theory provide a
robust lens through which to analyse and debate
carbon-control policies. From this perspective, the tran-
sition to a low-carbon economy is a state strategic
project intended to avert a crisis in capitalism’s relation-
ship with nature. The strategy’s objective is to stimulate
innovation, spur the shift to a new socio-technological
paradigm and usher in a new ‘low-carbon’ accumulation
strategy. For WHILE et al. (2010, p. 86), understanding
states’ eco-restructuring strategies requires an understand-
ing of how they ‘come to ground’ in regional economies.
This scale of analysis can illuminate the ways that
environmental re-regulation is sometimes co-opted to
the cause of neo-liberalism (KEIL, 2007), show how its
spatially differentiated outcomes can exacerbate social
and spatial inequalities (BAILEY, 2007), and reveal its
capacity to stimulate complex and territorially speciﬁc
political responses (CASTREE, 2010).
WHILE et al. (2010, p. 81) associate the idea of a tran-
sition to a low-carbon economy with a distinctive
‘carbon-control’ phase of eco-state development; a
phase in which states regulate to control emissions via
non-negotiable targets, often harnessing market forces
to stimulate the replacement of high emission fuels
with renewable energy sources. In this article, in contrast,
the notion of a transition to a low-carbon economy is
viewed as a ‘fuzzy’ concept with shifting meanings that
depend on the discourses in which it is embedded. For
green activists, it invokes the expectation of enforceable
targets and a rapid shift to renewable energy sources,
but for business groups the same phrase envisions a
‘business-as-usual’ transition of incremental technical
innovation and efﬁciency improvements. From a regula-
tionist perspective attuned to the politics of change
(JENSON, 1990) this lack of analytical clarity can be
understood as a means of enabling potentially conﬂicting
groups to agree on broad goals (reducing emissions) and
to instead debate questions of means. The agreed need
for a transition to a low-carbon economy then frames
the issue in a way that forecloses debate about the
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actual nature of the transition process and the uncertain-
ties of its pace and spatial patterning. The inﬁnite variety
of possible transition paths lies between two extremes: on
the one hand, an incremental and evolutionary change
process that would maintain social stability, but perhaps
at the cost of an unacceptably slow rate of decarboniza-
tion; on the other hand, a deep restructuring process
that mobilizes both capital and labour across regions but
risks throwing the strategic project and its sponsoring
government into crisis. These opposing views reﬂect
different understandings of the mechanisms driving
restructuring or renewal.
Deep restructuring occurs when state-led shifts in
accumulation strategies reconﬁgure industries and
regions and relocate economic activity in space. Follow-
ing MASSEY (1984), it can be surmised that the regional
expressions of this form of transition would be shaped by
each region’s historically produced characteristics. As the
economy transforms and new specializations emerge,
ﬁrms’ location decisions will be shaped by the relentless
push and pull of transaction costs, differential access to
resources and markets, the availability of specialized
labour and decisions about industrial organization. To
be sure, politics and power relationships, and the insti-
tutional frameworks they create, will shape how these
forces play out in speciﬁc places (CHRISTOPHERSON
and CLARK, 2007), but will do so within the underlying
realities of regional differences in the costs of the factors of
production. Outcomes in particular places will reﬂect
how the ‘stickiness’ of sunk costs in existing technologies,
infrastructure, institutions and immobile resources
constrain the ‘slippery’ movement of mobile capital
(MARKUSEN, 1996). If previous rounds of restructuring
are repeated, this process will produce uneven outcomes
as investment and employment shift to new, proﬁt-max-
imizing locations. The evidence suggests that the more
market-oriented the regulatory framework, the stronger
the tendency for radical spatial change (PECK and
TICKELL, 1995). Thus, a restructuring perspective antici-
pates that the transition to a low-carbon economy will
produce deep changes in regional fortunes, generating
winners and losers depending on where people live and
what they do for a living. Fossil-fuel specialized regions,
in particular, will face uncertain futures because once
these competitive economic forces are in play, it seems
almost impossible to reverse the process of disinvestment
from declining regions (HUDSON, 1994).
In contrast, evolutionary economic geographical per-
spectives invoke the expectation of in situ revitalization
and a gentler, stable and crisis-free transition. In this frame-
work, socio-technological regimes evolve in place-
speciﬁc ways and rates and produce place-speciﬁc social
and technical trajectories (LUNDVALL, 1992). Here, mul-
tiple relatively small policy and practice reorientations
within regional economies accumulate over time to
produce radical reorientations of local developmental tra-
jectories (SIMMIE and MARTIN, 2010). To effect an
endogenous transformation, places must overcome
their existing institutional and socio-technical ‘ﬁxes’
and purposefully graft new, redirected branches onto
their developmental pathways. In old industrial regions,
this bootstrap process can be triggered by reassembling
institutional frameworks to open them up to new ideas,
new technologies and new ways of doing. Regional
transformation can fail if institutional or technological
‘lock-ins’ stiﬂe innovation and inhibit attempts to redir-
ect local developmental pathways (GRABHER and
STARK, 1997). Lock-in has multiple expressions.
GRABHER (1993) distinguishes three interconnected
forms of institutional lock-in: the ‘functional’ lock-in
of established inter-ﬁrm relationships, the ‘cognitive’
lock-in of established worldviews and the ‘political’
lock-in of existing power relations. HUDSON (1994)
adds the deeply engrained social and cultural lock-in
that can arise when communities become over-reliant
on long-established paternalistic relations of production.
FREEMAN and PEREZ (1988) (also UNRUH, 2000) show
that technological lock-ins impel ﬁrms to persist with
sometimes inferior products or processes and discourage
them from adopting radically new technologies.
HASSINK and SHIN (2005) describe how ‘sunk’ or non-
recoverable investments in technologies, plant and
equipment inhibit transformative change. In the case of
the transformation to a low-carbon economy, DEL
RIO and UNRUH (2007) show how renewable technol-
ogies have been locked-out of contention by a combi-
nation of technical, economic, infrastructural and
institutional factors. These factors imply that theories of
endogenous regional growth can overplay the capacities
of local growth coalitions to instigate change and exag-
gerate their control over economic decisions. They can
also underplay the inﬂuence of political conﬂicts that
militate against the identiﬁcation of shared regional strat-
egies (MACKINNON et al., 2009). For PIKE et al. (2010),
the remedy is found in strategies that strengthen local net-
works, empower local actors, recognize a variety of poss-
ible growth paths and create spaces of collaboration in
which future paths emerge organically. Still, externally
imposed imperatives – such as those of emissions
reduction policies – must challenge regions’ capacities
to ﬁnd their own paths at their own pace.
These opposing perspectives agree that restructuring
national economies toward low carbon trajectories will
involve spatially uneven restructuringor renewal processes
inmultiple sub-national economies. To achieve its overall
goal, the transition to a low-carbon economy must shift
regional economies from their established developmental
paths and establish them in new low carbon trajectories.
In some places, emissions reduction will be accompanied
by growth and innovation; in others, by decline and disin-
vestment. The crucial issue for policy is managing the
change process in a way that achieves the desired out-
comes and simultaneously retains political support for
reform. As the case of policy development in Australia
shows, the crucial issue is identifying a politically feasible
pace and depth of regional change.
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AUSTRALIA’S STATE STRATEGY OF
TRANSITION TO A LOW-CARBON
ECONOMY
From 2007 until its collapse in 2009, the Australian gov-
ernment’s strategic approach to emissions reduction
took the form of a plan to create a market for carbon
through the introduction of a national Carbon Pollution
Reduction Scheme (CPRS). This proposed cap-and-
trade market solution would bring the cost of carbon
pollution into economic calculation and enforce abate-
ment targets. This approach is arguably the most efﬁ-
cient means of reducing emissions because it ‘restore(s)
an efﬁcient economic equilibrium in a competitive
market economy’ in a more politically acceptable way
than carbon taxes (KLINE, 2001, p. 97). According to
its proponents, market-based policy instruments are
the most efﬁcient option because they generate a
price-driven transformation without attempting to
‘pick winners’ and without trying to predict exactly
what outcomes would be produced. Instead, market
processes unleash Schumpeterian forces of destructive
innovation that overcome the economy’s inertia,
unlock institutional and technical barriers to change,
and stimulate the shift to a new low-emissions socio-
technical system. In theory, the cap-and-trade frame-
work enables the state to control the rate of change
through its control of the carbon price (UNRUH, 2002).
The development of Australia’s CPRS involved an
institutional and scalar realignment of political forces.
Australia is a federation formed in 1901 by previously
independent state governments. Under the Australian
Constitution, federal powers are in theory restricted to
interstate and international matters. However, the
federal jurisdiction has gradually increased its scope
and authority (WELLER, 2007). Climate change issues
are difﬁcult because they span state and federal areas of
responsibility. Moreover, this means that, in the Austra-
lian context, it is not possible for the national govern-
ment to devolve responsibility for the implementation
of difﬁcult decisions to the regional scale (as in WHILE
et al., 2010). During the conservative Howard govern-
ment’s federal administration, Australia’s climate strat-
egies had relied on voluntary actions (PAPADAKIS and
GRANT, 2003). In this context, the impetus for an Aus-
tralian carbon market emerged from the federation’s
States and Territories, via the 2004 Inter-Jurisdictional
Working Group on Emissions Trading (later the
National Emissions Trading Taskforce; NETT, 2007).
The federal Labor opposition then joined with the
state and territory governments to commission the inde-
pendent Garnaut Climate Change Review (GARNAUT,
2008).3 When the Rudd Labor administration came to
power federally in 2007, the Garnaut Review became
part of its programme as a joint Commonwealth-State
project. This meant that the CPRS emerged from
outside established national industry policy networks,
which had in the past opposed ‘carbon-control’ policy
solutions (BULKELEY, 2001). GARNAUT (2008) pre-
sented a cap-and-trade carbon market not only as
compatible with capitalist development, but also as the
strategy that would drive the next round of capitalist
accumulation and reposition the Australian economy
for future international competitiveness (GARNAUT,
2008). Since this strategy attempts to ‘establish a
widespread appeal by arguing that certain forms of
policy intervention can simultaneously result in both
economic and environmental beneﬁts’ (MURPHY and
GOULDSEN, 2000, p. 33), it can be understood as a
version of ecological modernization.
In Australia, detailed cost–beneﬁt assessments of
major policy changes are dominated by the powerful
calculative practices of general computable equilibrium
(GCE) econometric modelling. Although the key
contributors to the policy debate (the federal and state
governments, various industry groups, major ﬁrms and
think tanks) each commissioned their own modelling
of the CPRS, most used slightly different versions
of the same models. These models represent the
economy’s sub-sectors mathematically, as a series of
simultaneous equations that resolve as the factors of
production revalue after a policy shock. In essence,
the models operationalize neo-classical assumptions
about the role of prices in equalizing supply and
demand. Capital is assumed to ﬂow toward sectors
offering the best returns on investment, while labour
reallocates to its most efﬁcient use. The outputs plot a
continuous transition trajectory toward a new equili-
brium where prices reﬂect the unfettered interaction
of supply and demand. Predicted short- and longer-
term effects vary depending on the assumed direction
and rate of change and on the assumed capacity of differ-
ent markets to ‘clear’ (that is, return to equilibrium).
The models are stylized. Economic agents are assumed
to respond to price signals in a straightforward
manner. There are no institutional barriers, local
allegiances or technical lock-ins to inhibit the action
of market forces or close off inter-industry ﬂows of
capital and labour. The transition is smooth and com-
plete. The models are static, timeless and spatially
blind; they cannot examine the process of change,
identify a developmental path or enumerate the practical
interventions required to achieve target outcomes.
In this framework, the regional ‘structural adjustment’
process is extrinsic to the carbon-reduction policy
framework.4 Adjustment costs are minimized by remov-
ing regulatory barriers or market failures that impede the
ﬂow of factors to their most efﬁcient use (INDUSTRIES
ASSISTANCE COMMISSION (IAC), 1993).
In GCE-based cost–beneﬁt assessments, the counted
costs of policy change are restricted to the direct cost
implications of the policy under review. In the case of
the CPRS, for example, these include increasing
energy prices for consumers, the loss of asset value for
some high-emission ﬁrms and loss of export markets
for others. Only in speciﬁc circumstances would these
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direct losers qualify for ex post compensation. Structural
adjustment theory dictates that the form of compen-
sation should not compromise the policy objective or
impede the revaluations that underpin a market-based
adjustment process (GARNAUT, 2008). The indirect
effects of policy change – such as regional disinvestment,
ﬁrm closures, job losses, downward pressure on wages
and the cost to households of relocation – are not
direct costs of the policy and therefore should not
qualify for compensation. In fact, since inter-regional
adjustment is one of the principal means through
which capital and labour are reallocated and revalued,
in theory this policy framework welcomes the deep
regional transformations envisaged by restructuring
theory. However, in practice, the federal government’s
consultative Green Paper on the CPRS (COMMON-
WEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, 2008a) allowed for the possi-
bility of some compensation. The later White Paper
(COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, 2008b), which
was drafted in response to the concerns raised in
public consultations over the Green Paper proposals,
offered compensation to those who would be direct
losers of CPRS policies: electricity generators, trade
exposed industries and low income households. It also
offered token ‘structural adjustment’ payments to
adversely affected regions.
Before the White Paper compromise progressed into
policy, legislation needed to pass both Houses of the
federal Parliament. This required the support of either
the environmentalist Green Party – which at the time
held the balance of power – or the business-oriented
opposition parties. As it turned out, it was the compen-
sation package that exposed the fragility of political
support for the market-based CPRS strategy. For the
Greens, the CPRS did not go far enough and would
not produce the deep emissions reductions needed to
halt global warming. Moreover, its generous compen-
sation to ‘big polluters’ would stiﬂe the process of crea-
tive destruction that was needed to drive innovation in
low emissions technology. Although the opposition
position was to support the CPRS, many segments of
its business constituency were bitterly opposed to it, pri-
marily because of its likely impacts on the competitive-
ness of trade-exposed industries. Opposition support for
the scheme also evaporated after a coup in the shadow
cabinet that ousted the opposition leader and carbon-
trading advocate, Malcolm Turnbull. With no hope of
being passed through Parliament, the CPRS was
deferred indeﬁnitely. After the Government’s retreat,
industry lobby groups revised their positions and many
rejected the CPRS outright. Prime Minister Rudd,
the champion of the CPRS, was then ousted by his
Cabinet colleagues and replaced by Prime Minister
Gillard, a politician known for her capacity to negotiate
workable compromises. Soon after, in the August 2010
election, voting split regionally: urban constituencies
punished the Government for abandoning the CPRS
and voted ‘Green’, but regional voters shifted their
support to regional advocates of more moderate policies.
Making social and regional costs extrinsic to the CPRS
framework had created the illusion of an efﬁcient and
equitable policy framework, but the underlying
promise of adverse distributional effects could not be
suppressed. Examining how the CPRS might ‘come
to ground’ (WHILE et al., 2010, p. 86) in a vulnerable
region reveals the importance of these unacknowledged
social costs.
‘COMING TO GROUND’ IN THE LATROBE
VALLEY
The vulnerable region of the Latrobe Valley is located in
Australia’s south-eastern state of Victoria; about two
hours’ drive east of the state capital city of Melbourne
(Fig. 1). Its half a dozen townships are home to about
73000 people. The Valley is found in the centre of an
agricultural region known as Gippsland, which is an
imagined place, and an administrative region, but not
a governmental jurisdiction.
The Valley’s distinctive geography arises from its rich
and abundant deposits of brown coal, or lignite, which is
found so close to the land surface that it can be mined by
open cut methods. In the post-SecondWorldWar years,
this unusually inexpensive source of energy fuelled
Victoria’s then successful manufacturing-based import
replacement accumulation strategy. The Valley still pro-
duces more than 85% of the electricity used by Victoria’s
industries and 5 million residents. Although its reserves
could supply the State of Victoria with electricity for
the next 400 years, brown coal has high water content
and generates higher emissions than other fossil fuels
(this characteristic also makes it chemically unstable and
unsuitable for export). Of all places in Australia, there-
fore, the effects of policies that put a price on carbon
will be felt most acutely in the Valley (GARNAUT,
2008). Actual outcomes will be a product of the strategies
and behaviours of theValley’s communities, its electricity
supply industries and the Victorian state government.
The Valley communities
The Valley communities are a product of state-led
development. The Victorian government began con-
structing the Valley as a centre of electricity production
in the 1920s, when it established wholly state-owned
power stations adjacent to the Valley’s coal reserves.
As production and employment grew, subsidized
housing, regulated wages, unionized workplaces and
state-provided social infrastructure combined to create
a prosperous Valley community that epitomized the
‘male breadwinner and dependent family’ model of
the (then) Australian dream. In this secure context, the
Valley developed a perhaps exaggerated reputation for
militant unionism.5 One legacy of this history is the
Valley’s deeply gender-segmented labour market.
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Another is continuing tension between energy ﬁrms and
local unions.
In the 1980s, principally to relieve Victoria’s debt
burden but also to reduce escalating costs, the monolithic
state-owned energy producer, the State Electricity Com-
mission of Victoria (SECV), was broken up into multiple
quasi-competitive entities in preparation for privatization.
The accompanying rationalization of employment saw
the Valley’s energy workforce decline by 46.2%
between 1986 and 1994, from 20420 to 10997 workers
in a local labour force of around 40000 workers
(PULLIN and HAIDAR, 2002). The Valley’s four major
power stations, then its transmission, maintenance and
energy retailing activities were sold to private investors
(FAIRBROTHER and TESTI, 2002). In the 1990s, as a
direct consequence of these changes, the Valley suffered
the multiple problems familiar to de-industrializing
regions: high unemployment rates, low labour market
participation rates, high rates of welfare dependence,
depressed housing prices and abandoned commercial
properties. The Valley’s proud public service identity
degenerated into a victim mentality (GIBSON and
CAMERON, 2005). Over the last ten years, however,
with the support of state and federal governments, the
Valley economy has been diversiﬁed, mainly through
growth in population-related services (health, welfare,
education and retailing), forestry and the timber products
sector. State government ofﬁces, a government call
centre, a university campus and multiple state and feder-
ally funded community and social development services
have supported this new path. As a result, the Valley in
recent years has renewed its robust sense of local identity
(TOMANEY and SOMERVILLE, 2010).
The legacy of this history is that local attitudes to the
transition to a low-carbon economy’ are deﬁned by the
desire to avoid a repeat of the effects of the 1980s
privatization process. The expectations of GCE model-
ling – that labour markets rapidly ‘clear’ and regions
quickly return to stability – have little traction in this
community. Nonetheless, when the CPRS was being
debated, local green activists supported the rapid
closure of the Valley’s high-emissions power stations.
Then, the local council’s growth strategy was based on
population in-migration and economic diversiﬁcation
with a view to repositioning its economy as a service
centre for the greater Gippsland area. Since the collapse
of the CPRS, the local vision has expanded to include
the development of new energy and coal-related
specializations – responses that open up multiple poss-
ible future paths (as in PIKE et al., 2010). The hitch is
that local government in Australia has minimal power
to implement its vision. Local councils in Australia
lack what WEISS (1998) calls transformative capacity:
they have few responsibilities, are under-resourced and
have no powers of taxation save for modest property
rates. As a result, local growth coalitions, if they exist,
tend to orient their activities toward lobbying for State
and Federal funding (BEER, 2007). Importantly, local
government in the Valley has minimal control over
the activities of the power industry or the use of the
Fig. 1. Victoria’s Latrobe Valley
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coal resource, both of which are regulated by the State
government. As a consequence, the power stations’
social ‘licence to operate’ does not require negotiation
with local political actors. The principle of subsidiary –
that policy should be enacted at the lowest level of
government compatible with competent authority –
favours the Victorian state scale. The Valley’s future
will depend on decisions at other scales: energy ﬁrms
and the Victorian and federal governments.
The electricity production sector
After privatization, the Valley’s power stations
reorganized into sets of vertically integrated and quasi-
monopolisticﬁrms spanning coalmining, electricity gen-
eration, transmission and electricity retailing. The groups
are lean: they share specialist resources and cooperate on
common issues. Their employees are predominately
former SECV colleagues. After privatization, proﬁts
from electricity generation did not meet buyer
expectations (until recently, Victoria had regulated its
electricity prices) and as a result, many planned upgrades
were deferred or cancelled. A chronic lack of investor
interest in the Valley’s power generators is evidenced
by ownership changes and declining asset valuations.
One generator is nowowned by a patched-together con-
sortium of institutional investors. In reality, despite their
privatization, the Valley’s electricity producers have not
operated in a truly competitive market. Rather, the
Victorian government has manipulated access to
resources to ensure an adequate return on investment
in exchange for the delivery of an essential service.
As a consequence of this history, the privatized gen-
erators have been slow to innovate and appear to lack
the qualities that GRABHER and STARK (1997) identify
with the capacity for endogenous renewal. They feature
close inter-ﬁrm relationships, which tend to produce
what FREEMAN and PEREZ (1988) call ‘network
externality’ lock-ins. Their post-privatization ﬁnancial
arrangements, which are designed to maximize proﬁts
by leveraging debt on asset values, reduce their ﬂexi-
bility. In UNRUH’s (2002) assessment, these conditions
would reinforce the use of existing technologies and dis-
courage innovation. There are no energy research and
development facilities in the Valley, despite many of
its technical problems being unique to its lignite fuel
resource. Rather, local innovation has centred on adap-
tation to presenting threats, for example, by power
stations reducing their reliance on (scarce) potable
water. The privatized power stations have not invested
in the local labour market either. Because the privatiza-
tion process created a large pool of displaced but skilled
labour that could be re-enlisted as required, there has
been little need for training or workforce development.
The power stations now operate with a minimum
number of direct employees and use subcontracting
and labour hire arrangements to bring in specialist
skills as required. By 2006, therefore, only 6% of the
local labour force was employed directly in the electri-
city production sector (the power stations), but electri-
city-related activities still accounted for 23% of the
Valley’s total employment and almost one third of its
higher income employment (WELLER et al., 2009).
This fragmentation has fuelled the growth of numerous
small electricity-related service ﬁrms and transformed
the Valley into a centre for specialized high-voltage ser-
vices. Its ﬂexible electricity control, transmission and
maintenance labour force now services an Asia-Paciﬁc
market. This small-ﬁrm sector is locally embedded,
and therefore more ‘ﬁxed’ in place than the transna-
tional ﬁrms that operate the power stations.
Because the Valley’s coal-based power plants generate
high emissions, change is inevitable. General Comput-
able Equilibrium modelling undertaken in preparation
for the CPRS predicted that local generators would
face declining proﬁtability as the carbon price increased
and that they would eventually be forced out of the
market. Assuming that a fully operational national
market would enable power to be sourced from any
location in Australia, the Valley’s production would be
replaced by new energy sources. However, GCEmodel-
ling assumes that generator ﬁrms will continue to operate
as the carbon price rises, and that they will not exit until
their plants become unproﬁtable. In reality, ﬁrms behave
strategically. The transnational ﬁrms that own the
Valley’s power plants will make decisions about future
investments well in advance of the actual impacts of
policy changes. When the introduction of the CPRS
appeared imminent, the generators’ main concern was
that it would compromise asset values, put power stations
in breach of their debt covenants and induce technical
insolvency (SIMSHAUSER, 2008). This immediate
threat – and its extension into accompanying claims
that increased sovereign risk would discourage future
transnational investment in Australia – disappeared with
the shelving of the CPRS.6 Since then, the long-term
problem of lack of investment in the power sector has
been attributed to the policy uncertainty surrounding
the carbon price. This has produced an apparent ‘invest-
ment strike’ (KERR, 2009, p. 3) which has arisen, ﬁrst,
because ﬁrms are unable to assess the cost implications
of different new technologies; and second, because
they are reluctant to commercialize unproven technol-
ogies for fear that theymay inadvertently lock-in to tech-
nologies that are subsequently overtaken by other
options (the ‘beta’ video problem). Predictions about
the likely effects of carbon price are complicated by mul-
tiple issues that are not considered in GCE modelling: as
well as the uncertainty about technologies, there are
institutional and regulatory issues with the structure of
the national energy market, especially the relationship
between ‘baseload’ and ‘peaking’ power sources; the
effects of renewable energy targets (RETs); the effects
of long-term contracts for major electricity users such
as aluminium smelters; the intricacies of pricing within
ﬁrm networks; and, uncertainties in the market as to
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whether consumers will respond to a carbon price by
paying more for electricity or by reducing consumption.
Importantly, too, the CPRS would put control of the
electricity production industry into federal hands, oblit-
erating the sector’s carefully nurtured relationships with
State regulators.
Nonetheless,ﬁrms nowview a price on carbon as both
inevitable and necessary to stimulate a technology-led
revival of electricity production. From their perspective,
the actual price of carbon becomes the crucial determi-
nant of the nature of the forthcoming industrial transition
and its effects in theValley. A low-carbon price (say A$20
per tonne at current prices) would bring new investment
without jeopardizing business-as-usual production. A
high carbon price, on the other hand, would encourage
investment in lower-emission fuels and in different
places, and might trigger the premature exit of energy
ﬁrms from the Valley. All this boils down to a question
of whether the ‘stickiness’ of existing relationships, the
quality of the Valley’s electricity infrastructure and the
skills of its local labour force are enough to justify a con-
tinuing presence of energy producers, with or without
coal-based production. The Valley is not a suitable
location for wind or solar power generation, but it may
be feasible to reduce the emissions of coal-based pro-
duction, convert generation capacity to natural gas
(which is found nearby), or commercialize geothermal
and wave technologies. Most of the energy ﬁrms that
operate in the Valley already own assets elsewhere;
theywill make future investment decisions in their share-
holders’ interests.
The State of Victoria
The challenges facing the State of Victoria arise from its
economy’s reliance on cheap electricity, its sunk invest-
ments in an existing electricity infrastructure, its concerns
about energy security and its responsibility for the social
and regional consequences of federal policy. First,
Victoria has a large manufacturing sector which is a
major source of employment. Its competitiveness is
predicated on an abundant supply of inexpensive electri-
city. If other states develop lower-emission electricity
production capacity, as is likely that when a carbon
price is implemented, Victoria’s competitiveness and its
capacity to attract investment will decline relative to
other states. This would produce long-term adverse
regional re-distributional effects. In addition, without
some adjustment to state–federal funding agreements,
carbon price-induced increases in electricity costs for
schools, hospitals and government ofﬁces will put
pressure on the State budget. Second, because most of
Victoria’s electricity originates in the Latrobe Valley,
the state’s electricity grid is dominated by the high-
voltage corridor from the Valley to the urban centre of
Melbourne. Whilst the federal government’s CPRS
policy framework allowed that revenue from the
CPRS could be redirected to redeveloping the electricity
grid, the mechanism and timing for this redevelopment
was never explicit. Third are concerns about energy
security. In theory, as the carbon price pushes out the
Valley’s high-emission fuel sources, the national energy
market will provide Victoria with electricity generated
from natural gas and renewable sources in other parts of
the country. However, inter-state connections are
sparse and traverse long distances in inhospitable
terrain. The failure of the national grid during Victoria’s
heatwave and ﬁrestorm in the summer of 2009 high-
lighted the political risks of relying on imported electri-
city. Fourth, if as an outcome of a carbon price,
electricity production shifts from the Valley to other
places, the structure of the federation means that the
state will bear most of the cost of regional adjustment.
Although econometric modelling assumes that the
regional effects of policy change will evaporate over
time as workers out-migrate to take up new jobs in
new places, the experiences of privatization demon-
strated that the Valley’s ‘sticky’ labour market is unlikely
to adjust in the manner anticipated by structural adjust-
ment theory. In the 1990s, the absence of buyers in the
Valley’s depressed local housing market prevented
unemployed residents from moving out, while numer-
ous cheap rental properties attracted welfare dependent
in-migrants from other places. This created costly and
persistent social problems for the state government.
Although the state government supports the introduc-
tion of a carbon price, analysis of its effects highlights the
spatially uneven risks of a market-based transition and
the costs that the carbon price would add to the state’s
budget. Given these pressures, the imperative for the
state is to manage its transition to a low-carbon
economy in a way that avoids a crisis of local accumu-
lation, minimizes adverse social outcomes and deﬂects
adverse political repercussions. Yet stable outcomes and
planned incremental changes are difﬁcult to secure in a
market-based policy structure. To prepare for a future
carbon price, the state government has now committed
its resources to direct measures that stimulate innovation,
remove lock-ins and reduce emissions (VICTORIA, 2010).
Much of this effort will focus on addressing the Valley’s
‘market failures’ and encouraging its socio-technical
system to transform before a carbon price comes into
effect. In addition to investments in emissions-reduction
technologies such as front-end coal drying, coal gasiﬁca-
tion and liquefaction, and end-of-pipe carbon capture
and storage, the state is sponsoring projects to identify
more sustainable uses of the Valley’s coal resource and
to identify new industries ‘related’ to the Valley’s existing
small ﬁrm specializations (such as in transmission, battery
and renewable energy technologies). Effectively, the
state is implementing a pre-emptive ‘continuity’ approach
to change by removing the most offending aspects of the
outmoded socio-technical system and directly confront-
ing the lock-ins that stiﬂe innovation (UNRUH, 2002).
The state’s strategy seeks to maximize utilization of its
‘sunk’ costs in the Valley, build on the existing
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transmission framework andminimize social disruption in
the Valley communities. Still, the potential for disinvest-
ment from the Valley is ever present. The state’s recent
policy blueprint places responsibility for regional adjust-
ment costs with the federal government (VICTORIA,
2010), but at the time of writing, the federal government
had not accepted responsibility for the distributional con-
sequences of its policies.
CONCLUSION
This article has cast the 2010 failure of Australia’s carbon
emissions policy as a failure to recognize the regional
costs of the transition to a low-carbon economy.
Viewing the transition from a regulation perspective
attuned to the timing of policy change reveals that
carbon-reduction policies have signiﬁcant regional
implications that have not been made explicit in the
federal government’s policy assessment process.
Viewing the national transformation to a low-carbon
economy as involving a series of regional transform-
ations, and recognizing that these regional effects will
have signiﬁcant adverse consequences for some state jur-
isdictions, alters how the impacts of the Carbon Pol-
lution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) are perceived.
Whilst the inherently spatialized distributional effects
of policies have not been prominent in the public
policy debate, the spatially differentiated outcomes of
the August 2010 federal election suggest that state and
regional concerns were more important to the unravel-
ling of political support for the CPRS than was recog-
nized by commentators focused on emissions targets
and climate science. The formal policy development
process assessing the merits of a ‘cap and trade’
carbon-control regime assumed a structural adjustment
process in which regional economies would magically
return to a new ‘equilibrium’ after the carbon price
policy shock. This framework counted the direct cost
of the policy reforms, but ignored all the effects that
reverberate through regional economies, labour
markets, housing markets and households as ﬁrms rise
and fall and jobs are created and lost. Without a more
detailed understanding of these effects, it would be dif-
ﬁcult to identify an optimal carbon price that would
stimulate innovation but at the same time protect
regional economies and communities.
This perspective explains Australia’s retreat from
carbon trading and the policy community’s increasing
support for a carbon tax, which would price carbon but
also allow for planned change. In parallel with Australia’s
earlier internationalization strategy, then, it can be seen
that the market-led carbon-control solution failed
because it appended a regressive redistribution policy to
a progressive decarbonization policy. A better approach
would be to view decarbonization policies as inherently
redistributional and plan to improve the equity of out-
comes at the same time as reducing emissions.
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NOTES
1. Politically, this outcome arose because the policy proposals
were too radical for conservative politicians and too con-
servative for radical politicians. It will be argued that this
political effect expresses deep and spatially differentiated
divisions over environmental policy. In the August 2010
election, urban voters abandoned the incumbent Labor
administration in favour of Green Party candidates,
largely because it had failed to implement carbon-control
measures; but regional voters abandoned both the govern-
ment and the opposition, largely in response to the per-
ceived threat of carbon control. This delivered the
balance of political power to a handful of independent
regional representatives.
2. In 2007 in Bali, then Prime Minister Rudd cast climate
change action as ‘one of the greatest moral, economic
and environmental challenges of our age’ (RUDD, 2007,
n.p.). Unsurprisingly, his leadership failed with his failure
to implement a carbon-trading scheme.
3. Although in Australia the states are responsible for regional
development and natural resource allocation, they
cooperate with each other and the federal administration
through the Committee of Australian Governments
(COAG). Despite their political independence, the states
rely on ﬁscal transfers from the federal government. This
structure renders the federal government’s capacity to
dictate policy on carbon control as tenuous.
4. The Australian notion of ‘structural adjustment’ tends to
be associated with deep restructuring rather than incre-
mental change (cf. CHAPMAN et al., 2004).
5. Under Australia’s (then) system of centralized industrial
regulation, industrial gains achieved by workers in secure
sectors such as electricity production would ﬂow on to
workers in other industries and other places. This made
places like the Valley important strategic sites for national
union action (WELLER, 2007).
6. Here the notion of sovereign risk is deﬁned widely as
referring to all risks arising from the ability to governments
– as sovereign bodies – to pass laws and regulations.
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